[Editor'snote]

This article is an effort by the International News Center of The Paper News (www.thepaper.cn) and international relations scholars to jointly explore new forms of international current political commentary. following10 monthsAfter that, The Paper once again invited a number of international relations scholars in Shanghai to discuss the prospects of "Trump 2.0" based on their respective research fields.

We hope that this attempt of "international monthly trend talks" will continue and that more scholars can participate in it.

In the early morning of November 6, 2024 local time, US Republican presidential candidate and former President Trump delivered a speech at the Palm Beach Convention Center in Florida. Visual China Data Map

On November 6, local time, Trump was re-elected in this year's U.S. presidential election. What impact will this maverick and frequent "golden sentences" political strongman return again?

Experts participating in the discussion believe that in terms of the current two conflicts, Russia does not expect Trump to completely cut off aid to Ukraine when he comes to power. Although it has expectations for future Russia-US relations, it is still watching cautiously. If the United States reduces aid to Ukraine, Europe will have to pay more for its own security, and differences within the EU on how to deal with the Russia-Ukraine conflict will intensify. And a Europe that has become more strategically autonomous in the context of Trump's return may also be more ideological than in the past.

As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Trump is likely to continue the style of his first-term Middle East policy-favoring Israel, putting extreme pressure on Iran, and demanding that Middle East allies shoulder more defense spending. I wonder if he will recall the idea of expanding NATO to the Middle East mentioned in his first term, namely, establishing itNATO-ME(ME means Middle East).

In Asia, the small multilateral security architecture of the "United States, Japan, South Korea" and "United States, Japan and Philippines" led by the United States and Japan during the Democratic administration may not necessarily be liked by Trump. US-Japan relations will also face greater uncertainty. With Trump and Shigeru Ishiba in power respectively in the United States and Japan, the two sides may have discord over what constitutes an "equal" alliance.

The immigration issue that Trump has vowed to solve will also put greater pressure on Latin American countries. Latin American left-wing countries such as Cuba and Venezuela are more likely to face greater survival pressure. Trump's frequent interactions with Latin American far-right forces may make Latin American political division and polarization even more severe.

The following is a record of the discussion.

Ma Bin:Associate Researcher, Center for Russian Central Asian Studies, Fudan University

After Trump is re-elected, Ukraine should be more anxious. However, Russia's attitude is relatively vague. It feels that Russia has great expectations for Trump, but is very cautious in its statement.

When Trump takes office, U.S. aid to Ukraine will be greatly adjusted, but Russia will not expect the United States to completely cut off aid to Ukraine. The current Russian discussion on this issue is that Trump will conduct more reviews of the aid plan to Ukraine and there will be delays. There will be a certain correction in the support of the United States and NATO for Ukraine, and Europe's role will become more prominent. Russia believes that under such circumstances, Europe will have more say and bargaining chips.

At present, there are many voices in the Russian media and officials. For example, some believe that Trump will not change his policy towards Ukraine or change the state of Russia-US relations; some voices say that Russia can communicate with the United States, but the United States must take the initiative first, because Russia-US relations have reached this point because of the actions of the United States. These may all be strategic signals and can be seen as testing the US response. Overall, Russia is still waiting to see what specific policies Trump will introduce after taking office.

Jian Junbo:Deputy Director and Associate Professor of the Center for China-EU Relations at Fudan University, Deputy Secretary-General of the Shanghai European Society

The results of the U.S. election have brought new and huge challenges to Europe.

From a political perspective, the Trump administration may not emphasize external ideological competition and confrontation like the Democratic Biden administration. Therefore, it will not deliberately classify different countries as "democratic" or "authoritarian" countries at the global level. The "Global Democracy Summit" led by the United States will probably not continue to be held.

In this context, the EU will not be subject to ideological pressure from the United States, which will require Europe to maintain a politically consistent position with the United States and jointly respond to or even confront what the United States deems "authoritarian states." Despite this, the EU may become more radical in the ideological field than before. Because when the United States becomes more unilateralist and isolationist, the EU will become more active in strategic autonomy, and external competition or confrontation in the field of ideology (values and norms) is one of the important aspects that best reflects Europe's uniqueness and autonomy. One of the aspects-a Europe that emphasizes more strategic autonomy will also be a Europe that emphasizes more the characteristics of its own normative power.

In the economic field, no matter how "flattery" Europe is to Washington (For example, if it says it will buy more American natural gas), the Trump administration should impose tariff measures on Europe and restart a "trade war" in the fields of large aircraft, steel, aluminum and agricultural products, which may partially bring Europe to its knees in exchange for the United States and Brussels jointly take economic protectionist actions against China and some other emerging markets, including "de-risk" policies and the implementation of a transatlantic supply chain alliance; But on the other hand, Europe will also take measures to protect the strong common market, including strengthening the resilience, innovation and competitiveness of European industries through joint internal investment, and strengthening joint actions with external non-U.S. markets to resist U.S. tariff risks, and resist U.S. protectionism by strengthening the authority of the WTO. The institutional functions of the European and American Trade and Technology Council (TTC) may only be partially continued.

In the security field, Europe faces more intense risks. If the United States rapidly reduces military aid to Ukraine, it will widen divisions within the EU over responding to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, although at the political level these differences may be bridged after a period of internal chaos and continued support for Ukraine. A degree of agreement is reached, but it will cause lasting social divisions between Eastern and Southern Europe and Nordic countries. If the United States relaxes some NATO leadership and requires Europe to assume more self-defense capabilities, Europe will be forced to increase its defense budget or public spending and strengthen the difficult defense integration process, with active support from France.

In short, the Trump administration's political non-ideological approach, economic protectionism and security isolationism, and its policy towards Europe as a nation-state rather than a hegemonic country will put Europe in a more complicated situation than it is today. Europe will seek more possible cooperation opportunities with the United States to reduce political pressure from the United States, but it will also breed more rifts due to direct economic and trade conflicts and differences in the security field. In any case, Europe and the United States will continue to be strong allies in maintaining the liberal international order and jointly respond to what they see as "global challenges."

Zhang Chuchu:Associate Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Deputy Director, Center for Middle East Studies, Fudan University

Trump is re-elected as president of the United States. In the future, his Middle East policy may be similar to the policy of his first term, but it will also be adjusted based on the new regional and global situation.

First of all, Trump may favor Israel in the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict, use tough measures to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and promote the "Abraham" process. Trump actively favored the Netanyahu government during his previous term, becoming the first U.S. president to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. After he comes to power again, he is afraid that he will continue to expand military and intelligence support for Israel to ensure Israel's military advantage in regional security.

Secondly, in terms of his attitude towards Iran, Trump may generally remain tough on Iran and exert extreme pressure on Tehran by focusing on preventing Iran from exporting oil to the outside world. However, as a transactional politician, it does not rule out that he has room to negotiate with Iran's reformist President Pezehizyan. Trump may take advantage of the weakness of Iran's economy to meet with Pezehizyan, thereby increasing his exposure.

Moreover, in his attitude towards Gulf countries, Trump may adopt a pragmatic strategy to deal with relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, while requiring regional allies to pay for their own security. Trump advocates the "America First" principle and regards the security protection of regional allies as a commercial service. He does not want to pay unilaterally to allow allies to take the "free shuttle bus." Therefore, after taking office, he is afraid that he will continue to reduce his military presence in the Middle East, including reducing the size of troops in Syria and Iraq. In the Gulf countries, Trump's prerequisite for maintaining or even increasing the U.S. military presence there is demand for allies to increase defense spending, especially pressure on Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to assume more security responsibilities themselves.

In addition, on energy issues, Trump advocates reducing restrictions on domestic fossil fuels and reducing dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Trump has repeatedly said that he has no intention of increasing investment on issues such as climate change and energy conservation and carbon reduction. On the contrary, in order to boost U.S. industry, Trump may relax restrictions on domestic oil and natural gas exploration, while opening up more oil exploration and production licenses in places such as Alaska. If global oil prices fluctuate due to the unstable situation in the Middle East, Trump may negotiate with major oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq to keep oil prices relatively stable. On the one hand, this move may increase the energy independence of the United States and thus increase the bargaining chip of the United States in the global energy market. On the other hand, it may trigger a drop in international oil prices, and Middle Eastern oil-producing countries may also face a sharp drop in income.

Wang Xiaoyu:Associate Researcher, Center for Middle East Studies, Fudan University

When Trump is re-elected, his policy orientation is bound to have a profound impact on the global economy and will also add new complexity and uncertainty to the free trade zone negotiations between the Gulf Cooperation Council and other countries.

First of all, trade protectionism is surging. Trump advocates "America first", strengthens protectionism, plans to impose high tariffs on goods from many countries, including China, and reports that tariffs on goods imported from China may be increased to 60%. This tough approach may aggravate global trade frictions and may trigger retaliatory tariff measures, making global trade relations even more tense. For the GCC countries, the Sino-US trade dispute will undoubtedly put them in a dilemma and will also make them cautious in free trade zone negotiations with other countries and affect the negotiation process.

Second, the challenge of global supply chain restructuring. The high tariff policy has prompted multinational companies to readjust the layout of global supply chains and increase efforts to transfer some production lines to Southeast Asia, Latin America and other places, breaking the traditional supply model. This will also pose a dilemma for the GCC countries.

Third, the "crowding out effect" in the financial sector has emerged. Trump's policies may further consolidate the status of the US dollar and attract global capital back to the United States. GCC countries may also prefer the US dollar system. This option may add complexity to financial cooperation in the free trade zone.

Fourth, the regionalization trend of global industrial chains is increasing. The United States promotes a regional layout of high-tech industries, or encourages multinational companies to transfer supply chains to the United States and regional markets through technology export restrictions. GCC countries tend to cooperate with the United States in cutting-edge technology fields such as 5G and artificial intelligence or due to external pressure.

Finally, the shocks facing emerging economies cannot be ignored. Trump's high tariff policy will deal a direct blow to export-dependent emerging economies, especially countries that are highly dependent on the U.S. market. In this context, GCC countries may re-evaluate their export strategies and pay more attention to regional market diversification to spread risks and reduce dependence on a single market, which will also bring new opportunities for cooperation between the GCC and other countries in the free trade zone.

Wang Guangtao:Associate Professor, Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University

On November 11, after two rounds of elections in the Japanese House of Representatives, Shigeru Ishiba was able to continue to serve as prime minister with a majority of votes. However, the ruling coalition formed by the Liberal Democratic Party and the Komeito Party lost half of its seats in the House of Representatives, and the operation of the self-government coalition regime in the future will face more variables. At least in the areas of relevant important policy issues, the Shipo regime must seek the support of other key opposition parties, and the introduction of relevant policies faces many obstacles. Especially with the Senate election next summer, if Shigeru Ishiba's regime cannot properly handle the "black gold scandal" in the Liberal Democratic Party and improve economic, social and people's livelihood issues, then the Liberal Democratic Party may encounter greater setbacks in the Senate election next year. By then, it will not be just a matter as simple as Shigeru Ishiba's stepping down.

In terms of foreign relations, considering Trump's re-election as President of the United States, Shigeru Ishiba may be one of the few candidates in Japanese politics who can negotiate with Trump. However, the uncertainty facing Japan-US relations is obviously greater than that during the Democratic Party. This is not something Japan can decide, but caused by Trump's own uncertainty.

At the same time, the certainty of Sino-Japanese relations has begun to increase. High-level interactions between China and Japan have been relatively frequent in recent times, which shows signs of improvement in bilateral relations. Trump's election may promote further improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Of course, this improvement is limited and cannot be decided unilaterally by Trump or the United States. On the afternoon of November 15, local time, President Xi Jinping met with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba while attending the APEC Leaders 'Informal Meeting in Lima. This is a very positive signal and will surely promote the development of China-Japan relations.

In the field of military security, neither Trump nor Shigeru Ishiba are satisfied with the current status quo of the Japan-US alliance. Trump requires Japan to assume more responsibilities and obligations. After taking office, he may ask Japan to bear more expenses for US troops stationed in Japan and purchase more U.S. military equipment; Shigeru Ishiba demands equal status in the Japan-US alliance, and even advocates deploying the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in places such as Guam. Obviously, the United States and Japan have a deviation in their understanding of "inequality." At the same time, small multilateral security structures such as "the United States, Japan, South Korea" and "the United States, Japan and the Philippines" led by the United States and Japan during the Democratic Party may face impact. Based on Trump's ruling style in his first term, he may not necessarily prefer this small multilateral architecture. Perhaps taking this factor into account, on November 16 local time, the leaders of the United States, Japan and South Korea held trilateral talks during the APEC summit, with the intention of allowing Trump to adhere to the security architecture of the United States, Japan and South Korea after taking office.

Cao Ting:Deputy Director of the Latin American Studies Office, School of International Studies, Fudan University

Compared with Biden, Trump's policy towards Latin America will be stronger, emphasizing "American interests first." During Trump's first term, the United States frequently exerted pressure on Mexico and Central American countries on immigration and security issues, and exerted extreme pressure on radical left-wing countries, causing US-Latin America relations to fall into a trough. Trump's re-election has once again cast a shadow on U.S. -Latin America relations. However, it is unknown whether the next Trump administration will partially continue Biden's policies or innovate.

On November 6, 2024 local time, in Mexico City, the capital of Mexico, a woman walks past a newsstand displaying front-page news about the U.S. presidential election. Visual China Data Map

There is widespread speculation in the outside world that differences and frictions in U.S. -Mexico relations may intensify. First, Mexico will face challenges in economic and trade cooperation with the United States. Trump wants to revitalize U.S. manufacturing, so he has always advocated imposing high tariffs on Mexican car exports. On October 13, Trump said in an interview that if he is elected, he may impose tariffs of more than 200% on vehicles imported from Mexico. The review and renewal negotiations of the US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement will be held in 2026, when Mexico may face more challenges from Trump.

Secondly, Trump is known for being tough on illegal immigrants. During the campaign, he reiterated that he would expel 1 million illegal immigrants after taking office. Therefore, countries such as Mexico and Central America will face greater pressure to accept illegal immigrants back.

Third, the United States and Mexico may have discord over anti-drug issues. Trump once threatened to list Mexican drug cartels as terrorist organizations and send troops to eliminate them, which is unacceptable to Mexico's left-wing government.

At the same time, Latin American leftist governments may face greater pressure to survive. Previously, when Trump was in power, he put "extreme pressure" on Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Trump fears that further strengthening economic sanctions and tightening visa and remittance policies against Cuba may aggravate Cuba's survival crisis. Trump said Venezuela's election lacked fairness and freedom, and accused the Biden administration of once relaxing sanctions against Venezuela. It may increase sanctions on the Maduro government. Moreover, the Trump administration may follow its usual practice of increasing military deterrence against Venezuela, actively supporting the opposition, and encouraging regional right-wing forces to unite against Maduro.

It is also worth noting that in recent years, Trump has interacted frequently with extreme right-wing politicians such as former Brazilian President Bolsonaro and Argentine President Millay. It expanded political mobilization through the U.S. Conservative Political Action Conference, organized activities in Latin America, and spread ultra-conservative ideas. Trump may further use his power to expand his influence on Latin American ideology and encourage the rise of regional far-right forces. By then, the political division and polarization in Latin America may become even more severe.